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Panel “Social Rights and Capabilities” 
(SASE Conference, Paris, 16-18 July 2009) 
 
Deliberative democracy and its informational basis: what lessons 
from the Capability Approach1  
 
Robert Salais (Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin) 
 
 
The crucial point in Amartya Sen’s approach lies in his emphasis on the informational 
basis of judgment (IBJ), which determines the content and methods of collective choice 
in a democracy.  Indeed, Sen maintains the need for an objective assessment of the state 
of persons (against the dominant trend of purely ordinal rankings).  To provide the 
grounds for agreement (and for disagreement, as we shall see), what we will call the 
“table2 of the situation” must be just, in the twofold sense of objectively right and 
socially fair.  This “table” will thus cover what Sen calls “the territory of justice”:  
“The informational basis of judgment identifies the information on which the judgment is 
directly dependent – and no less important – asserts that the truth or falsehood of any 
other type of information cannot directly influence the correctness of the judgment.  The 
informational basis of judgment of justice thus determines the factual territory over which 
considerations of justice would directly apply”. (Sen, 1990: 111) 
Such requirements are extremely difficult to fulfil, both theoretically and empirically. 
I. Real freedom and capability  
In discussing the informational basis of judgment, Amartya Sen has joined a debate 
amply circumscribed by the pioneering works of Kenneth Arrow and John Rawls, which 
he sought to push to the breaking point, but without going beyond it.  His results, 
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 Modified version of my contribution : « Capacités, base informationnelle et démocratie délibérative. Le 
(contre)-exemple de l’action publique européenne » in : Jean De Munck and Bénédicte Zimmermann 
(eds.), 2008, La liberté au prisme des capacités. Amartya Sen au-delà du libéralisme, Paris, Editions de 
l’EHESS, Raisons pratiques 18, p. 297-326. Translated by Susan Taponier.  
2
 Translated from « tableau » in French. We are playing here with the double meaning of this word in 
French: « picture » and « statistical table ». 
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although impressive, too often remain restricted by too simple interpretive frameworks.  
His critique of well-being as a relevant metric is accepted, but is mostly understood as an 
empirical effort to take more detailed situational data into account in assessing the state 
of individuals (essentially the definition of a list of functionings to be used as a yardstick 
for objectively comparing situations).  His focus on individual freedom is obviously 
appreciated, but it is reduced to the standard problem of specifying the scope of 
opportunities more clearly. Though using it in a much more refined methodology, Sen 
remains trapped into the dominant positivist approach to social reality. In the rare 
instances when he resorts to statistical data, Sen takes it at face value (though it has been 
carefully selected). He has not really drawn out the implications of his intuition that 
“description is choice”.3  In a word, Sen neglects the socially constructed dimension of 
knowledge and its implications, an issue the implications of which, by contrast, will 
constitute the core of our paper.  
1.1. The socially constructed dimension of knowledge 
Before becoming information, economic and social reality is shaped by cognitive 
frameworks (the categories and social processes involved in knowledge). Such 
frameworks build and select, for the members of a community, information (and 
assessment) about what is and what is not important as a problem to be dealt with by the 
community (and the state).  In other terms, informational bases of judgment are not 
merely sets of empirical data; they are first and foremost the product of national states 
and communities, which historically have been assigned the task (in a specific way by 
each country) of producing public knowledge of the common good so that concrete 
action can be taken to achieve it.  Yet, as we shall see in Part II, these national cognitive 
categories are precisely what the technologies of governance promoted by the European 
Union are attacking.  In attacking cognitive categories, they are also attacking national 
public policies – and therefore governments, what citizens expect from them, and key 
dimensions that are constitutive of their national identity.  Sen’s underestimation of the 
so-built character of information is therefore fraught with consequences for what the 
capabilities approach can contribute, particularly the renewal of social criticism. However 
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there are several points on which Sen’s approach ultimately marks a potential break from 
the standard approach, even from the standard works about deliberative democracy. 
 
We will stress two of these breaking points: capability as the power to be and to do (1.2); 
the table of the situation as an instance of cognitive representation (1.3). 
1.2. Capability and the conceptions of real freedom 
The first breaking point is obviously the concept of capability.  There are two dominant 
interpretations of this concept from which Sen departs. The first one is individual 
competence, a notion arising from corporate management. One can find it, for example, 
in the French expression capacité d’insertion professionnelle (capability of professional 
insertion), which is a politically biased translation of the concept of “employability” used 
in EU documents. The second one is the individual’s control over his or her choice, a 
notion arising from the liberal model.  These two interpretations form a common 
backdrop for governance technologies.  Sen (1985: 208) underlines that the individual’s 
control over his or her choice was opposed to another interpretation of freedom (and 
therefore of capabilities), namely the power to be and to do, an interpretation that 
suggests a more radical theoretical and political innovation.  How the individual choice is 
made is of little importance; what matters is that the person has the power to achieve the 
beings and doings that he or she values.  
 
The example used by Sen (1985) pertains to two ways of living in an environment free 
from the threat of epidemics.4  One way is to give individuals the freedom to choose to 
remain or to leave, based on their own calculation in terms of their personal preferences 
and utilities.  The other is to conduct public policies that eradicate the risk of epidemics.  
In this case, the individuals have the power to live in a healthy environment.  This 
approach gives them the real possibility of doing so, even though individually they have 
not explicitly made the choice from among a range of opportunities.  By freeing them 
from an individual choice in the face of the danger of epidemics, which is unequal 
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because it is subject to the constraint of resources, such a policy gives everyone access to 
real freedom. 
 
Making this distinction between two conceptions of real freedom gradually leads us to 
favour a definition of capability as “the power to choose alternate ways of being and 
doing” (1.2.1) and to emphasise the need to include the (otherwise lacking) common 
good in the conceptual framework (1.2.2).  By extending these conceptions, we can 
establish both the theoretical and practical connection between the capability approach 
and deliberative democracy. 
1.2.1. Capability as the power to choose alternate ways of being and doing  
Sen is very aware of the role of public policies in promoting capabilities5: “Freedom has 
many aspects. Being free to live the way one would like may be enormously helped by 
the choice of others and it would be a mistake to think of achievements only in terms of 
active choice by oneself. A person’s ability to achieve various valuable functionings may 
be greatly enhanced by public action and policy, and these expansions of capability are 
not unimportant to freedom” (Sen, 1993: 44).  He nevertheless spent little time debating 
the implications of real freedom as the power of being and doing differently. Examining 
them would help to dispel the ambiguities of the concept regarding the public action to be 
undertaken.  It is tempting and even necessary (though it will take us away from the 
problems at hand) to allude to the concept of possibility presented by Ernst Bloch, for 
example.6  Freedom as the power to be and to do implies that, in the situation she has, the 
person’s access to functionings he or she values must really be possible.  This 
presupposes that the external conditions (the environment) and the internal conditions 
(the person’s aptitudes and resources) can be adequately combined to achieve valuable 
functionings.  To borrow Ernst Bloch’s terms, we must distinguish between two 
dimensions of possibility: alternate ways of doing (i.e. the person’s ability or aptitude in a 
situation) and alternate ways of being (i.e. the potentiality contained in the things 
surrounding the person). 
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 And of others, which questions, too, the role of public action to favour coordination that enhances 
capabilities and to orient individual action toward the taking into account of others.     
6
 Bloch, 1976: 280-281. 
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Here are some examples.  A disabled person – all things being equal in other respects – 
has fewer capabilities to travel freely in the city.  Which solution would be most effective 
and fair: to give the person sufficient financial compensation to pay for the services of a 
chauffeur or to equip public transport (and the road network) with the facilities required 
for disabled persons to get on and off the bus by adapting the doors and sidewalks?  The 
first proposal comes under an alternate way of doing: giving money increases the 
freedom to choose from among several options.  The second proposal comes under an 
alternate way of being. It consists of a policy of public investment in things. In that 
option, the disabled person becomes truly identical to others. In many countries, a 
married woman with small children – all things being equal in other respects – has fewer 
capabilities to find a good job than a man or a single woman.  This is not because she has 
fewer resources or skills (the internal conditions) but because the characteristics of her 
situation, the prevailing conception of public policies and the organisation of jobs and the 
labour market (the external conditions) work against her: no day care centres nearby; the 
children’s school schedule (e.g. the school day ends at midday); no workstation 
organisation to ensure a certain amount of flexibility between work and private life; etc.  
Attempting to offset this inequality through additional financial resources or affirmative 
action is not useless, but it is more costly and less effective that implementing public 
polices that concretely give married women equal capabilities to find good jobs. 
 
Nevertheless – and this is an important point – for Sen (and possibly for Bloch as well), 
human action has the last word.  One is free to choose to use the especially adapted bus 
or not, to put one’s children in day care or not.  From the standpoint of justice, the 
essential factor is that the real possibility or potentiality of an alternate way of being and 
of doing exists. This possibility creates real collective freedom which is valid for 
everyone concerned, even if the only way we can grasp the conditions that must be 
fulfilled is by putting ourselves in the other person’s shoes and projecting ourselves into 
in his or her situation as if we were experiencing it ourselves.  Sen stresses the conversion 
factors that – given equal resources – lead to unequal results in terms of capabilities: 
individual factors (what we called earlier “internal conditions”); social factors (the social 
norms in force); environmental factors (in other words, the external conditions).  We 
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must go further than that, however.  For this brief discussion underscores the fact that, 
depending on whether we give priority to the first type of factors or to the others, public 
action will implement either individual free choice or free access to a real possibility.  We 
could find more complex examples, in which external and internal conditions are 
combined (if only the combination of material obstacles and adaptive preferences in the 
face of discrimination in the case of women).  In practice in every instance a problem of 
hierarchy or antecedence arises between these two conceptions of real freedom.  
 
In leaving the last word to human action, Sen establishes a fruitful relationship between 
the responsible exercise of freedom and learning.  The first is the prerequisite for the 
second, and vice versa.  If a “virtuous circle” is created, the scope of achievements and 
actual freedoms will widen at the same pace.  People will develop practical knowledge in 
this area, which will become both a condition and the purpose of capabilities in the sense 
of the power to achieve an alternate way of being and of doing.  What is important for 
public authorities is that the informational basis of judgment underlying policy decisions 
has correctly taken into account the individual’s situation from the standpoint of possible 
valuable outcomes.  It should be noted in passing that possibility as an alternate way of 
being or doing will orient the development of the IBJ towards comparing the states of the 
person over time with regard to those outcomes in relation to the functionings the person 
values.  
1.2.2. Capabilities, individual rights and the common good  
The above distinction between the two conceptions of real freedom affects our 
conception of the implementation of individual rights (rights established by the 
constitution or by laws7 such as the right to education, freedom of opinion, social security 
and housing).  In the first option (individual control), emphasis will be placed on the right 
to appeal and impartial procedures to challenge decisions and correct injustices done to 
the individual.  But what does an individual right to appeal mean with regard to housing 
(which each person in substandard housing would have to struggle to have recognised)?  
Freedom of opinion restricted to a right to appeal, although not worthless, would be 
meagre indeed. So and too in the area of social rights, only free access to real possibility 
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(the second option) gives the person a genuine capability – in this example, the 
authorities build housing.  
 
Questioning the concept of capabilities goes further still.  Once we bring in the state, our 
questioning will affect the theoretical and practical status we give to various conceptions 
of justice.  Again, the problem with Sen’s theoretical framework is that it does not 
include the common good, which is called for and even presupposed by the hypothesis of 
a substantial informational basis of judgment.  Why?  In order to reach agreement on the 
facts that make up the “territory of justice” (whether the territory concerns poverty, the 
reduction of inequalities or full employment, etc.), such collective objectives must have a 
value not only for the state but for all (or at least a significant number) of the members of 
the community.  They have then to agree to make publicly known the relevant social facts 
to collectively deal with. So reluctant they could be, they will have to face the facts that 
the unemployed and the poor exist, that the fortunate will have to finance the cost of 
solidarity by paying taxes, that employers are not doing their duty, etc.  They will have, 
thus, to accept a compromise between their conception of justice and that of the others. It 
will not be a procedural compromise but a compromise inscribed in cognitive categories, 
in public knowledge (common knowledge) and in things.  History shows that such 
acceptance is possible and under certain circumstances will give rise to a general 
commitment to the common good, but it also shows that this commitment is becoming 
increasingly problematic.  
 
Let us come back for a moment to the two conceptions of real freedom and to the public 
policies that flow from them.  When it comes to individual freedom of choice among 
various life options, it is difficult to deny that people are free to espouse their individual 
conceptions of justice and of their own good as long as they do not infringe upon, let us 
say, the social order or accepted standards of behaviour,8 etc.  That does not rule out 
public policy, but it will consist mainly of rather Rawlsian market regulation (we are 
close to that in this case), amended by the guarantee that certain fundamental rights (basic 
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capabilities) of the destitute will be respected, in keeping with the current standards in the 
society and historical period under consideration.  The common good will be limited to 
procedures that encourage and frame the individual’s search for his or her private own 
good.  Only the most destitute will be in the information basis, which could lead to public 
action that is more paternalistic than democratic.  Of course a policy of fundamental 
rights is not nothing; it may even be revolutionary in many countries.  But do we really 
need to basis it on the conceptual framework used – or rather, on its innovations? 
 
When public policy is based on access to real possibility and consequently the state 
invests substantial resources in things and in people, it can only promote functionings 
considered valuable by the community and for the community as a whole, rather than 
satisfy individual whims, however inoffensive or even sympathetically they may be 
viewed by others.  The problem of determining the list of valuable functionings must then 
be understood as a deliberation leading to agreement on the substance of the common 
good.  We are no longer in the realm of political consensus, regardless of whether it is 
founded on principles of justice or on optimal rules of deliberation.  We are basically 
entering into the search for collective agreement on the relevant social facts for public 
action, an agreement in which everyone must take part and which raises crucial questions 
about democratic deliberation.  
 
Such social facts are not restricted to general cognitive categories; they are situated, or 
better still, have to be situated in a territory of justice that is relevant to the problem 
under consideration.  If the state is going to focus its action on giving members of the 
community access to real possibility, then the necessary counterpart (or rather, the other 
side of the process) will obviously be to involve them in determining that action.  For 
they alone possess the key to (without being necessary aware of that) the concrete reality 
of situations.  Without their participation, it is impossible to bring out the internal and 
external characteristics of the situation that enable real possibility to emerge.  The 
expected counterpart of their participation – and the underlying motive – is the 
development of their capabilities.  In our opinion, this is where the unity of the 
capabilities approach lies – between its substance (the capabilities) and its procedures 
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(democratic deliberation) – a unity so difficult to find in Sen’s work.  It means we must 
orient the specification of the concept of capability towards real possibility and focus 
deliberation on establishing the relevant facts. This leads us to the concept of deliberative 
social inquiry (as we shall see in Part III).  
1.3. The “table of the situation” as an instance of cognitive representation 
Upon closer scrutiny, although according to Sen’s definition, the informational basis of 
judgment circumscribes the territory of justice on the basis of facts, it nevertheless carries 
strong normative weight.  To be inside or outside the territory consequently means the 
persons in question will or will not receive aid from the community depending on how 
they are described (in which category or even which line, column and box in the table).  
This is especially serious as it is a question of what is socially fair and objectively right.  
An erroneous or voluntary biased observation in establishing the informational basis of 
judgment will have tangible consequences for the very persons for whom it is designed.  
 
From this, we must conclude that there are two levels of political representation rather 
than just one: the representation of interests (this is the only one that is usually taken into 
account); and the cognitive representation of situations.  Each of us is represented in the 
informational basis of judgment.  We are somewhere in a box in some table at the 
intersection of categories of social classification; we are contributing to some magnitude 
or some rate.  For example, the employment rate represents each of us as satisfied to have 
a job no matter what it is or as wanting one, regardless of its quality or our aspirations or 
demands.  In a more general way, the arguments relating to the social facts presented in 
public debate treat us as inhabitants of possible worlds in which those arguments would 
be true.  
 
That second level concerns the formatting of the information and the system of categories 
that represent a person’s situation from the standpoint of the public action to be 
undertaken.  The question implied by this (as well as by the preceding point) is: what are 
the circumstances under which citizens do or do not participate, and if they do, at what 
levels, in developing cognitive frameworks that are adequate to what they consider a fair 
handling of the problems.  A corollary question: could they enter into the deliberative 
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process and what would be their chances of succeeding if they were not endowed with a 
certain sense of the common good or involved in a political process that led them to 
acquire and develop this sense? 
 
II. Cognitive conventions and political conventions: the European 
example of the Open Method of Coordination 
However, social criticism today must cope with a new element: the emergence of 
political strategies of rational action whose effectiveness lies in manipulating established 
informational bases of judgment.  In the employment policies promoted by the European 
Union authorities (the example we are going to use), a “job” is no longer what it 
promised to be in the model of full employment, i.e. in terms of the level and guarantee 
of remuneration, security in the face of unforeseeable events and social and economic 
rights.  It generally tends to bring greater insecurity in life and work and a loss of real 
freedom of choice.  Logically, increased insecurity in life and work should prompt an 
enrichment of the informational basis in order to improve the quality of employment.  
And this quality should be understood as the scope of possibilities for living and working 
opened up by employment, which is precisely what the capability approach has been 
working to achieve.  In practice, the policymaking of the European authorities is moving 
in the other direction.  It consists in preserving national employment and unemployment 
categories in name only, while in practice interpreting them in such a way as to call them 
into question.  In this interpretation, any work task, even one without any guarantees or 
any future, is called “employment”. Far from enriching the informational basis, the 
European authorities downgrade it to the level of a scorecard (like those one can find 
among firms’ management tools) and drastically reformulate it as a set of performance 
indicators, selected without any real democratic deliberation. 
 
In such a context, social criticism cannot be confined to relying on established facts.  Its 
problem becomes to build what Bohman, 1999, calls a new understanding of economic 
and social reality.  It must find a way to take part in establishing the facts that will give 
rise to action.  It should not only militate in favour of an informational basis in terms of 
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capabilities, but even more it should find the political channels to make itself heard and 
actually influence the content and methods of such a basis.  We will attempt later on to 
suggest that this involves the two sides of a single process, that is, of the constitution of a 
public (to use Dewey’s concept). Such a process generates a population grouped together 
around a particular problem that shares a common knowledge about it, which they refine 
and put into action together. 
 
Before we go any further, we would like to characterise the truly innovative elements 
contributed by the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC).  In short, this method 
of governance turns statistical conventions into political instruments.  As a consequence, 
evidence, especially statistical evidence, of the effectiveness of public policies (for 
instance in increasing employment and reducing unemployment) cannot be taken as the 
truth of the situation; they themselves should be subject to scrutiny. 
2.1. Turning statistical conventions into political instruments 
In earlier papers9 I have shown how far, when using the OMC, the selection of a given set 
of indicators frames the normative background of the political decision-making process. 
It is neither malignity nor political cunning. It is the mere consequence of the fact that 
any indicator (or guideline) selects what is worth to be known or not and, so doing, 
basically builds the reality that is relevant both for the deliberative process preceding the 
decision and for the action to be undertaken. In other words, contrary to many radical 
critics who, for instance, denounce the European Employment Strategy (EES) for its neo-
liberal ideology, the basic issue with the OMC in the EES is not strategic action, or 
ideology. The basic issue is about the cognitive conventions that are selected to drive the 
political process. One should pay attention to what is ordinarily taking for granted, hence 
invisible, that is the collection of statistical tables that, for each yearly report, national 
administrations are required to fulfil in the areas using the OMC. One must suspect that, 
to a large extent, these tables are the driving forces “behind” the formalism. 
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Contrary to the standard view, a table is not only a collection of figures (one in each box, 
for instance, as in a double-entry table), some being higher and others lower, from which 
one can draw conclusions like “the female rate of employment in 2005 is higher in the 
UK than in France”. A table is, above all, a procedure for aggregating individual 
situations, for instance relating to employment and the person’s position in the labour 
market. All situations compiled in the table which are considered as identical are placed 
in the one box, as if they were equivalent according to a given criterion or property 
(characteristic). Filling a table by combining individual data requires conventions of 
equivalence, which decide about what should be considered as similar (or, in other words, 
equivalent). By this logic, all women assigned by the compiler to the box of those “who 
have employment” will be considered equivalent in terms of the “having employment”. 
But where does the description of what constitutes a “woman in work” start or, for that 
matter, end? Conventions of equivalence govern what we select, what we exclude and 
what we construct. Thus, the requested description becomes not far removed from a 
normative evaluation of the situation under review.  
 
If we want to understand what a table means and does, we need to analyse the underlying 
methodology, i.e. the conventions of equivalence which have been used and the context 
in which a table is involved. Generally speaking, conventions of equivalence are ignored 
or misunderstood by the ordinary users. Usually, users take figures as, a prima facie, they 
seem to be, which means they interpret them with their own categories.10 From the above 
statement on female rates, they will spontaneously conclude that “women work less in 
France than in the United Kingdom”. But this conclusion is valid only if the legal, 
statistical and social definitions of what should be considered as a “job” are identical in 
the two countries. It is not the case, for the UK is using a “softer” definition of partial-
time work, which leads to consider women with very few hours worked a week as having 
a job and to push them into such jobs. Part at least of these women would not be 
considered as such in France.   
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This France-UK example underlines the political potential that resides in directly 
choosing what people and policy-makers should consider as the relevant information to 
deal with collective problems. In the EES, choosing the global rate of employment as the 
key objective of maximise and asking the Member states to consider that any task of at 
least one hour a week is a “job” create incentives to deregulate national labour markets in 
order to increase the national performance. 
2.2. Political efficacy of the method 
The method derives its political efficacy from three aspects: creating a situation of 
cognitive ambiguity, producing justifications and disqualifying unknown factors.  
 
The veil of ignorance surrounding the statistical conventions used to produce the figures 
creates a situation of cognitive ambiguity. This ambiguity acts like a smokescreen, 
allowing the conventions adopted as a benchmark for public policy to be changed without 
any awareness or protest on the part of the public.  For example, if the employment rate 
goes up, ordinary citizens conclude that their chances of finding a job (corresponding to 
their criteria for a good job) are going to improve.  But the European authorities may well 
– and in fact do – ascribe a totally different meaning to the notion of employment, one 
that resonates with the labour market deregulation policy they are pursuing, which 
obviously works against the expectations of the ordinary citizen.  Since it is difficult for 
citizens, who have nothing but their individual, local experience to go on, to test general 
categories, this situation may last.  In a situation of cognitive ambiguity, the task of the 
authorities consists in maintaining discursive consistency between the established 
meaning and the new meaning they assign to each category.  Referring to Austin, 196211, 
one could say that, while employing the same discourse, the European Commission is 
acting to modify all the possible worlds in which the language convention (“to have a 
job”) is valid.  Believing they have remained in the same world, citizens set about 
looking for a job according to the established categories in their world, only to find 
themselves confronted by a world in which the same terms are interpreted differently and 
refer to other actions. 
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 Reference used by Bohman, 1996: 204. 
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What is more, through its self-referential logic, this political method produces 
justifications of its efficacy that are not only theoretical but also concrete.  The change in 
the rules of public policies (in this case, employment policies) does not aim to improve 
actual social situations but to directly boost scores on performance indicators.  The 
ratings go up without any real improvement in social situations.  In fact, those situations 
may even deteriorate under the impact of standard, short-term measures that cost little per 
beneficiary because they are designed to affect as many people as possible.  The 
management of public agencies – from the national to the local level – is reorganised 
according to the logic of performance criteria.  As a result, the data based on management 
and on assessment operating rules consequently show progress is being made.  They may 
even be used to demonstrate of the veracity of the policy position.  In other words, even if 
it was not their initial goal, reforms tend to establish a direct connection at every level 
between management and the production of evidence – in other words, self-fulfilling 
justifications. 
  
Perhaps the more worrying aspect of procedures like OMC is that, by creating an 
environment of procedures of information and of evaluation adequate to predefined 
political goals (ultimately, a system self-producing proofs), it leads to growing 
difficulties to articulate legitimate alternative claims. As figures and procedures are seen 
by most of the people as guaranteeing truth by their mere existence, they allow endorsing 
political credibility. Even if the public debate begins to be fed with such fabricated data 
(without any professional or democratic control of their process of production), it 
nevertheless means for people that the “facts” are already there. As already existing 
evidence, these “facts” format the public debate. So it becomes harder to set claims which 
have not been the object, not only of cognitive elaboration but, more deeply, of common 
knowledge. For to be heard, claims need to be backed by “facts”; these facts must also be 
understood, which means that they can constitute the basis for shared understanding 
within the political community. 
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At the end, this means that the practical experience and knowledge of people, coming 
from their life, their work or from their participation to political life are potentially 
disqualified. They risk losing any access to what one can call a social process of 
generalisation. It would become difficult to transform practical knowledge into general 
claims. If true, the path for democratic expression would be cut, even if, formally, 
democracy remains. The social foundations for active political participation and of 
citizenship would be undermined, the value of them disappearing for part of the 
population. It is the reason why one should speak of a-democracy as the ultimate step of 
the diffusion of such political methods.  
III. The situated state: the point where the capabilities approach 
converges with deliberative democracy 
 The European Open Method of Coordination and more broadly New Public Management 
are the latest and perhaps the last avatars of states that could be described as holistic in 
terms of the way they were planned and introduced during the 20th century.  In such 
states, the common good is defined in reference to an all-encompassing doctrine viewed 
as pre-existing and external to the society (such as “the market”, “socialism”, etc.). 
Having the potential to be described a priori, such doctrines enjoy the status of 
unquestionable truth.  Hence, strictly speaking, the common good is not imposed; due to 
its status, it is considered the object of a consensus that does not need to be recognised by 
each citizen individually in order to exist.  
 
Such holistic constructions of the common good are not opposed to the individual 
freedom of autonomy; they merely deny that this freedom is capable of adjusting 
harmoniously to the common good.  This denial is used to create a rift between individual 
freedom and the quest for the common good, into which the rational methods of 
governance insinuate themselves.  By a priori constructing and selecting the reality on 
which the debate must focus, the New Public Management defines at the outset which 
issues are relevant and thereby structures collective choice as well as the direction to be 
taken in seeking solutions.  The democratic process is not eliminated, but it is contained 
and guided from outside towards predetermined results.  Moreover, the process is self-
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referential: it produces its own justifications in the form of empirically evident statistical 
results.  It tends to bar the way to a plurality of demands and solutions.  And it gradually 
restrains the real freedom of at least some members of the community in terms of living, 
working or democratic participation. 
3.1. The situated state 
To counter this deviation of democratic mechanisms, our working hypothesis is that 
social criticism demonstrates in practice that it is possible to engage in a different kind of 
public action, action that implies a type of state that, unlike holistic states, refuses any 
prior aggregation and founds the concrete achievement of the common good on the active 
intervention of its citizens.  With Michael Storper, we have called this type of state a 
“situated state”.12  In the last part of this paper, we would like to show how the advances 
contained in Sen’s work converge with the findings of research on deliberative 
democracy and help to clarify how a situated state can foster the constitution of publics 
and bring about a change in deliberative practices.   
 
In our definition, a situated state goes beyond abstract general categories to assign the 
common good a content indexed to the situation.  It is impossible to describe the common 
good a priori beyond formulating a fundamental objective such as ensuring full 
employment, reducing inequality, satisfying the right to education, etc.  It remains 
collectively knowable, provided it refers to specific situations of collective action; it 
becomes known in the course of that action itself and is achieved by a public that joins 
together for that purpose.  Knowing and achieving the common good thus become the 
two sides of a single social process rooted in a situation.  A situated state does not 
deliberately try to manipulate general categories but rather to promote processes of 
collective knowledge of problems (with intermediate levels that vary in their results and 
can be dynamically revised, involving and thereby creating publics).   In the new political 
context now taking shape, the problem of democracy is that, before a problem can be 
solved, it must first be constituted as a problem of common interest; to do that, an 
objective judgment (what we call common knowledge) must be formed about it.  The 
                                                 
12
 Salais and Storper, 1993: 328-348. 
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relevant facts must be constructed (or reconstructed) in a type of democratic process that 
avoids the manipulation characteristic of rational political governance and allows the 
community to form well-founded judgements with regards to the reality and the quest for 
the common good. 
 
The situated state will therefore orient its action away from achieving political consensus 
on procedures towards seeking a compromise on the content of the common good.  This 
implies a number of questions that are seldom raised in the literature such as the relevant 
scope and content of the situation in relation to the common good. How is the situation to 
be described?  What do we need to know and how can we find out? How can each person 
develop the capabilities to act for the common good? How can the state be present in the 
situation alongside the actors to help them rather than substitute itself for them in 
concretely achieving the common good? What are the contours of a deliberative process 
that democratically constitutes the public along with implementing social inquiry creating 
common knowledge within that public.  We will limit ourselves to this last point in the 
next section.      
3.2. Deliberative democracy and practical knowledge 
To try and make some headway on this question, let us first look at how research can be 
used in the area of deliberative democracy.  On the whole, the seminal works do not offer 
much in the way of encouragement.  In the wake of Rawls and Habermas, research work 
has become normative and is usually limited to studying the conditions with which 
political procedures must comply in order to achieve a political consensus13. This has 
little to do with the search for objectivity in collective judgment.  Nevertheless, recent 
work has focused on observing real situations and reincorporating the virtues of 
disagreement.  This brings us closer to the issue.  James Bohman14 emphasises that, for 
free and equal exchange of arguments (reasons) to take place, a deliberative procedure 
must satisfy the requirement of equal capabilities to deliberate or what he called an 
“equal capability for public functioning”.  More generally, for social criticism to succeed 
                                                 
13
 The work of Joshua Cohen, which is remarkable in other respects, is a good example of this.  See his 
contributions in Bohman and Rehg, 1999. 
14
 Bohman, 1999. 
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in a particular area, it must build a “new understanding” of the economic and social 
phenomena that develop within it.  In Bohman’s view, this new understanding entails 
building new collective causes, endowing them with legitimacy and mobilising 
communities of influence within civil society able to share that cause and to commit to it.  
Samantha Besson and Chantal Mouffe15 encourage us to abandon the dream of rational 
consensus pursued by Rawls and Habermas because it is unattainable  – and we would 
add – too easily manipulated.  Trying to achieve consensus by avoiding the substantial 
issues or through negotiated accommodation may in fact overpower the need to bring the 
reasons (or the scope of what can be considered reasonable) to the attention of the public.  
By clarifying the basis of disagreement for the participants, deliberation can, on the 
contrary, have the beneficial effect of enriching their conceptions and making the process 
more informative, consistent and thoughtful.  For Besson, disagreement must be seen as a 
creative resource for deliberation.  Disagreement does not rule out the possibility of 
partial agreements, for example on which variables are relevant to the problem or how 
some of their aspects should be dealt with; the possibility of partial agreements will 
become even more visible. 
 
What this works lack, however, is thinking about why, in addition to the general 
knowledge supplied by the sciences and the experts, citizen participation in collective 
decision-making is irreplaceable.  It is possible and even necessary to say their 
participation is justified by basic principles (the virtue of the democratic model itself), but 
that is no longer enough.  The fundamental reason for social criticism lies in the real 
value of the knowledge arising from social practice that citizens possess.  
 
Research on democratic experimentalism16 has grasped the importance of involving 
citizens in developing and processing information to implement local policies based on 
general macro objectives.  It provides convincing examples of cooperative action in large 
American cities such as Chicago where the police force works jointly with concerned 
citizens to define local police policy.  Teams are set up at the local level to identify and 
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 Besson, 2003; Mouffe, 2000.  
16
 Sabel, 1994; Sabel, 1996 ; Dorf and Sabel, 1997.  
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solve problems.  Residents are invited to take part in the process of delineation as well as 
formulate strategies and assess the results.  The Centre (in this case, Chicago’s 
Community Policing Evaluation Consortium) is in charge of collecting, sharing 
articulating and later disseminating the experience (in other words, the practical 
knowledge) revealed by these local efforts at problem solving (Sabel and Dorf, 1997: 76-
80).      
 
In so doing, democratic experimentalism calls into question the strict separation and 
established hierarchy between scientific knowledge (intended to develop general 
categories) and practical knowledge (reduced to the local level and consequently assumed 
to be prone to erroneous judgments) that we find, for example, in Habermas’ two-track 
approach to deliberative democracy.17  For Habermas, practical knowledge is the driving 
force in the informal debates of civil society and helps generate new topics, but it is up to 
the formal institutional sphere (to which the social sciences belong) to develop adequate 
knowledge for political decision-making.  Our analysis suggests, on the contrary, that the 
political technologies of governance flourish, precisely by keeping these two paths 
separate.  While civil societies (at the national and EU levels) remain the locus for 
highlighting the issues and mediating them, they are also prey to serious manipulation.  It 
is not enough to have the strategic and political support of civil and social society. One 
must also put into question the process by which knowledge is provided to the civil and 
social society.  In a way or another, the civil and social society should become true 
producers of that knowledge, and not only consumers. The how to produce will be 
addressed in the next paragraph.  
 
The strength of democratic experimentalism lies in its conviction that a community is 
capable of defining the issues and the criteria for their assessment through the forms of 
local democracy as well as the procedures to follow in implementing and adjusting the 
solutions.  But its weak point – which ends up outweighing its strength because it fails to 
prevent the manipulation of participatory democracy – is to try and justify state action by 
combining participatory democracy with market efficiency.  Such an approach is 
                                                 
17
 Habermas, 1996a; for a Bohman critique, 1996, p. 172 et seq.. 
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comprehensible in an Anglo-Saxon context, but it confuses increased performance with 
progress towards achieving the common good.18 As Sabel and Dorf, 1997:26-28, 
indicate, it reduces institutions to procedures of learning by monitoring, i.e. a conception 
very similar to the rational governance used by the European Union.  The collective view 
of the problem to be solved is limited to sharing information (without realising that the 
constitution of cognitive frameworks is at issue).  The citizen is immediately too 
optimistically considered an “expert on community life” (op. cit.: 76), which overlooks 
the very difficult problem of transforming practical knowledge into general knowledge.  
The federal level is conceived as providing individuals and their local authorities the 
information they have gathered along with benchmarking and performance assessment 
techniques.  It remains in control of the “technical” aspects of the process.  As a result, 
such research remains under the spell of the OMC and fails to grasp its strategies for 
instrumentalising collective initiative and autonomy.19  The qualitative change implied by 
the leap from company management to state action is never really analysed. 
3.3. Situated deliberation according to Sen: constructing the objectivity of judgment 
One must say that Sen’s approach goes further than the previous works in breaking away 
from the standard characterisation of deliberation.  According to the logic of his model 
for public action, in order to assess the possibilities of each person, it is necessary to 
identify and construct the variables that describe his or her state (the “focal features”, to 
use Sen’s concept).  It means that common knowledge has to be constructed by 
combining the use of general categories (or rules) with the relevant singular aspects of the 
situation.   
 
                                                 
18
 Joerges, 2006 (p. 272 et seq.) notes that democratic experimentalism “proposes to use qualities inherent 
in the economic sphere to establish the criteria for what good governance should achieve” and thus 
embraces in a deceptively mild form the legacy of the strong state recommended by ordo-liberalism.   This 
model of governance in which bureaucrats and experts exchange best practices runs the risk of “promoting 
executive authority and diminishing the virtues of democratic accountability of leaders, the rule of law and 
its judicial control” 
19
 Trubek and Mosher 2003 is a caricature in this respect.  The authors consider as an evident fact (i.e. 
immediately derived from data on employment and unemployment) that the governments set themselves 
the task in 1997 of improving the employment situation, without even examining the strategic, and 
therefore political, reasons that drove them to put this issue at the top of their agenda.  
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Indeed, there is no a priori reason why the “territory of justice” that proves to be relevant 
for person A should have exactly the same scope or characteristics as that of person B.  
The variables of action (the focal features) for a given problem differ in the situations of 
A and B; or A is better than B at a particular functioning but is less capable with regard to 
another.  The list of relevant functionings – i.e. those that may require public action – can 
vary between the situations of A and B.  For example, inadequate revenue must be 
corrected in the case of A, whereas for B (a woman with young children who wants to 
work), characteristics such as lack of day care are more important than revenue.  The 
level at which the situation must be defined, as well as its scope – in other words, the 
level at which the relevant cognitive categories have to be constructed and the nature of 
those categories– will depend on the problem.  Moreover, the configuration of the 
situation under review usually calls for joint implementation of a variety of resources 
ranging from the most general (monetary allocations, entitlements) to the most concrete 
and case-specific (for instance the particular content and length of training).  How these 
resources should be combined can only be decided in the situation, based on its specific 
features.  As a result, a territory of justice, although centred on the person, is not 
inherently individual.  Its social scope and scale will vary depending on the problem and 
cannot be determined a priori from the outside.  Instead, the scope and scale of such 
deliberative and cognitive territories must emerge dynamically from society itself, with a 
diversity of possible contents and configurations depending of the issue at stake. 
 
Sen approaches deliberation at the most general level, namely, society considered as a 
whole and makes an original contribution to it.  It is not up to theoreticians to define the 
list of valuable functionings through exterior knowledge, but rather society itself through 
democratic deliberation.  From an ethical standpoint, he is convinced that any community 
must choose and specify by itself the functionings it considers valuable, for this is the 
only way to be relatively sure that their specifications will be adapted to the type and 
degree of its economic and social development.20  Indeed, Sen reveals here a genuine 
aspiration for a situated state.  In line with the developments in Part I, we can conclude 
that what is at stake here is not prior deliberation over which norm is the right one (a 
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 Sen, 2004 
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conception based on a hypothetical ontological plurality of norms), but deliberation 
suited to an adequate grasp of the social reality (a conception based on the observation of 
a variety of situations from the viewpoint of the scope of capabilities).  Empirical 
diversity should be understood as the outcome of compromises between the operating 
methods and resources of normative and political models.  It must be the starting point 
for action, not the normative models. The fact remains that Sen did not pose the problem 
of deliberation at the concrete level of the life-world (le monde vécu in French).   
However he began to raise the essential and most difficult problem of reaching collective 
agreement on which facts adequately account for diversity.  The question is this: how is it 
possible through a process of political deliberation to arrive at an objective judgment 
regarding the concrete reality of things and persons?  Objective because it is recognised 
by everyone as just, in the twofold sense of right and fair, and as a result leads to good 
actions. If such objectivity is attained, conflicts over normative foundations are reduced 
to discursive, self-interested justifications that cannot withstand – without bad faith – the 
test of evidence arising from the process of establishing the facts.  For, in this case, 
objectivity is not produced a priori by the technologies used for governance; it has 
become common knowledge as the outcome of a democratic process that has been 
developed as far as it can possibly go.  In a democracy, it is perfectly legitimate to refuse 
to consider the political implications of the knowledge about the social, even the common 
knowledge, but denying its truth-value carries with it the danger of being excluded from 
the deliberative process and destroying the credibility of one’s own claims. 
3.4. Construction of common knowledge and deliberative procedures in the 
Capability Approach 
In the socio-political context emerging today, partly under the influence of the 
construction of the European Union, in which general categories are instrumentalised, 
social criticism is faced with the need to test the evidence presented by political 
authorities for the ethical and democratic quality of their actions.  This need is appearing 
at various levels with regard to various collective problems. 
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James Bohman21, to come back to him, has taken a particular interest in how to go about 
guaranteeing that deliberative procedures give what one might call – in a situated state 
approach – equal consideration to the participants.  He has therefore transposed the 
concept of capability to this problem.  Indeed, there are significant inequalities among 
participants in terms of their political power, the scale and quality of the resources they 
are able (or ready) to provide, their practical knowledge about the problem to be solved 
and their ability to formulate their ideas adequately.  Deliberative procedure must be 
designed in such a way as to ensure that each person can be heard and understood by the 
others.  Any idea or resource, no matter how insignificant it may appear at first glance, 
could turn out to be decisive in finding a just, effective solution.  Bohman argues in 
favour of state neutrality towards the interested parties and even for its intervention to 
neutralise any inequalities in their capability to deliberate.  However, in our view he 
neglects certain consequences of the previous discussion, especially the priority that 
should be given to establishing common knowledge in order to constitute a public.  If the 
constitution of the public is still guided by the search for political consensus on the 
solutions, even after inequalities in deliberative capabilities have been neutralised, it will 
still be over-determined by strategic actions and will not result in a genuine commitment 
to the common good.  
  
Collectively constituting knowledge that can be raised against what the authorities say 
and do implies bringing out into the public sphere and debate what, in a certain sense 
without realising it, the potential public of a situation already knows from its practice and 
experience. But this potential public has yet to recognise its truth-value and discover its 
implications with regard to how the situation is configured and what can be done within 
it.  To use a revised version of Sen’s language, the situation presents possibilities for 
alternate ways of being and doing that offer the promise of capabilities for people.  The 
political challenge is to bring these possibilities to light, to make them achievable and 
ultimately accessible.  
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 In Bohman, 1996, 1999, op. cit.  
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As the research work on deliberative democracy has emphasised, ideas and their mutual 
comprehension arise and progress through discussion.  But as Sen indirectly points out, 
the discussion must be concerned with relevant facts, which allows it as far as possible to 
avoid strategic manipulation and strive for objectivity.  It is aimed not at determining 
what should be done, but rather, in order to do something, what do we need to know and 
how can we find out it.  In other terms, it concerns the informational basis of judgment 
related to the situation.  
 
If this knowledge is constituted in line with the strategic logic of the actors involved, the 
basis will be empty, for reasons that are easy to understand.  The actors grasp reality 
through frameworks that are oriented towards the ends they are pursuing and backed up 
by the norms they value.  The only information they format is what they consider relevant 
to those ends and values and they leave the rest aside.  The meaning they attribute to this 
“portion” of reality is linked to what they grasp and they deduce from it the course of 
action that is in their best interests.  Since the framework of understanding and the norms 
vary from one actor to the next, the portions of reality they see and to which they assign a 
strategic meaning may ultimately prove to be quite different and without any 
overlapping22.   If the actors were sincere – but they will not –they would discover at the 
outcome of the process what they put into it at the outset and be forced to acknowledge 
that they do not share the same analytic frameworks or interests or norms. 
 
If it is made up of citizens’ opinions (their so-called “expertise”) such a basis will be 
inconsistent.  A different way of proceeding consists in turning the combined 
construction of a public and of common knowledge into a process of mediating 
competing interests.  This means using knowledge building as a vehicle to introduce an 
ethic of objectivity into the deliberation.  The purpose of deliberation is not to achieve 
consensus but to allow the participants to pursue their disagreement, provided it is 
expressed within the framework of the common knowledge created.  If the process can be 
successfully completed, the disagreement will focus – to use Sen’s terms, 1993 – on the 
weight and dominance ranking of the various pieces of information contained in the 
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 Contrary to Rawls’ expectations 
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basis.  In the terms used by Mouffe, 2000, the process will transform the figure of the 
enemy into that of an adversary.  Finally, insofar the process assigns a general value to 
practical, local and individual knowledge it should include specialists of inquiries on the 
social (researchers, lawyers and statisticians).  They would act as third parties, using their 
methodologies to develop questions, categories and nomenclatures, survey methods and a 
format for presenting the results.  Their role would be to constitute the table of the 
situation in the sense of cognitive representation, as we saw earlier, and present it as both 
a mirror and a subject of debate likely to raise the awareness of the public as a public.   
They would focus on bringing out the general knowledge contained in the practical 
knowledge of the persons (as well as sharing it and making it public); they would not act 
as experts (delivering their pre-constructed knowledge to the ignorant), but as go-
betweens from the singular to the general.  The word “go-between” seems more 
appropriate here than “translator”, because it is not simply a question of transcribing local 
knowledge into already existing general categories.  At the same time, such “go-
betweens” would not divest themselves of their already constituted knowledge before 
encountering the situation, but rather use that knowledge in such a way as to create a 
bridge with the individuals’ life-worlds.  The constraint of equality capability to 
deliberate put forward by Bohman takes on its full value of ensuring that each person has 
an equal chance to move from the particular knowledge that she possesses to general 
knowledge. 
 
More broadly, from this point of view, militants tend to be identified with investigators 
and knowledge builders, in an unusual kind of investigation one might call a deliberative 
inquiry.  The format of such an inquiry is modelled on sociological or ethnological 
inquiries, but it attempts to provide the latent significance (which transforms its meaning) 
of the general implications of practical knowledge with the status of scientific objectivity.  
In this case, scientific methodology is more than merely heuristic; it becomes ethically 
necessary to transpose it to the field of deliberative democracy.  For its purpose is to 
enable a constituted public to enter into public deliberation facing the political 
authorities, armed with an achievable alternative way of being and doing and supported 
by objectively grounded, legitimate knowledge that cannot be disregarded.  
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Without pushing the analogy too far, Stavo-Debauge and Trom, 2004, offer an 
enlightening analysis of the social movement that saved the old section of Lyon from 
destruction and preserved its cultural heritage for the future.  Their study shows how the 
militants succeeded in joining the perceptual experience of district residents to scientific 
knowledge of its historic past (as it was categorised and listed under the forms of 
buildings and remarkable architectural or decorative elements).  The informational basis 
changes when the references to the common good are shifting from public hygiene and 
housing standards toward historical patrimony and heritage.  In the key moment (the 
cognitive moment) of their deliberative inquiry (to use our notion), the militants became 
“go-betweens” when they illuminated – in the strict sense – what was hidden beneath the 
filth of the old buildings during an evening visit of the site that was open to the public.  
More generally, a great deal of study is being devoted today to that cognitive moment 
that enables practical experience in a situation to combine with the general precepts of 
economic development.  There is a whole spectrum of approaches23 ranging from 
manipulating local knowledge through indicator-based management (as in the European 
OMC) to ethnological surveys focused on giving a voice to the people concerned.   
 
The “democratic” advantages of deliberative inquiries are revealed in the results we 
would expect.  Common knowledge constructed through deliberation is not a mere sum 
of sentiments, opinions or subjective, empirical assessments, nor is it a diktat out of the 
blue.  It organises and weighs; it creates the facts and thus provides an incentive, in 
certain configurations, to reformulate the issues and choose other ways to solve the 
problems.  It gives the weight of truth for criticizing the “facts” rationally fabricated by 
authorities in search of justification.  It gradually adds something to the deliberation that 
was not there in the beginning.  
 
For some, if not for everyone, accepting facts established deliberatively may prove to be 
demanding.  While confirming many initial judgments, the inquiry might show that some 
of these assessments are groundless.  On the other hand, it could reveal significant new 
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 Cf., for example, Engel and Salomon, 2002; Engel, Carlsson and van Zee, 2003. 
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facts that must be taken into account.  It may force some, under pain of being excluded 
from the deliberative process (or of realising their voice is no longer being heard), to 
redefine their analysis of the situation as well as their demands.  But it will do so in an 
authentic way, not merely in the mode of rhetorical, strategic justification.  For, the 
outcome of such inquiry is to formulate an agreement on the facts to be taken into 
account in describing reality in all its diversity.  Consequently, it will not eliminate 
contradictions or antagonisms.  But it reformulates them as sets of arguments that may be 
disapproved by some participants but are nevertheless understood by everyone because 
they stem from the same accepted knowledge basis.  When social criticism focuses on 
introducing new categories and cognitive variables and makes the objectivity of 
knowledge the basis for action, it can introduce new data to the description of the facts 
(the second form of political representation) that will support those whose voices were 
not represented until then in the political process (the first form of representation).  Even 
if their demands do not succeed at the outset (because they are given insufficient weight 
in the subsequent decision-making process) at least they will be heard and no one will be 
able to deny their existence or their legitimacy.  The social process and collective action 
keep alive the possibilities to have the last word. 
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